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Abstract 
Supply chain management is critically dependent 
on trusted email mechanisms that address forgery, 
confidentiality, and sender authenticity. The IETF 
protocol ‘Domain Authentication of Named Entities’ 
(DANE) described in this paper has been extended 
from its initial goal of providing TLS web site 
validation to also offer a foundation for globally 
scalable and interoperable email security.  Widespread 
deployment of DANE will require more than raw 
technology standards, however.  Workflow automation 
mechanisms will need to emerge in order to simplify 
the publishing and retrieval of cryptographic 
credentials that are applicable for general audiences.  
Security policy enforcement will also need to be 
addressed.  This paper gives a descriptive tutorial of 
trusted email technologies, shows how DANE solves 
key distribution logistics, and then suggests desirable 
automation components that could accelerate 
deployment of DANE-based trusted email.  Pilot 
deployments are briefly described. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Email is one of the most critical communication 
tools used in supply chain management. It is relied 
upon for a wide range of messages: partner-to-partner, 
customer-to-vendor, order processing and billing, and 
everyday intra- and inter-company communications. 
The inconvenient truth, however, is that email as 
typically used today cannot be relied upon. 
It is difficult to tell if an email is fraudulent. An 
original email message can be modified by a man-in-
the-middle attack; for example, to alter a bank routing 
number used for electronic payments. Phishing and 
spear phishing attacks are common and have become 
extremely sophisticated. Attackers are able to 
manipulate organizations for financial gain, espionage, 
or to launch malware.  
Email is the preferred channel for launching 
targeted cyber attacks. Email is the weak link in 
government and enterprise security; it is hard to protect 
because email is not secure and is subject to social 
engineering. There are numerous examples of the 
abuse of email. A sampling of reports sorted from 2011 
to 2016 shows a growing trend to targeted spear 
phishing: 
• The 2011 OMB Report to Congress cites US 
CERT (The United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team) reporting 51.2% of 107,655 
incidents reported by public agencies were 
phishing [1, 2]. 
• The Cisco1 2011 Security White Paper Email 
Attacks: This Time It’s Personal illustrates the 
economic gain for attackers in moving away from 
mass attack phishing to targeted spear phishing 
attacks. In just one year the cyber criminal 
monetary benefit rose from $50 million to $150 
million [3]. 
• Trend Labs 2012 Research Paper Spear-Phishing 
Email: Most Favored APT Attack Bait indicates 
that 65% of incidents were targeted to 
Government [4]. 
• The 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigation 
Report states that 30% of phishing messages 
were opened by targets and 12% went on to click 
malicious attachments. The majority of phishing 
cases are used as a means to install persistent 
malware. Cyber-Espionage was found in 68 
examples of phishing/social engineering attacks 
[5]. 
• As a specific example, Arrow Electronics, a 
major distributor, revealed that they were the 
victims of a $13 million theft in early 2016 based 
on a combination of social engineering and spear 
                                                
1 Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials 
(or suppliers, or software,...) are identified in this paper to 
foster understanding. Such identification does not imply 
recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, nor does it imply that the 
materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best 
available for the purpose. 
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phishing in which an executive was impersonated 
[6]. 
Various approaches have been used to mitigate 
these problems. Application firewalls, Bayesian spam 
filters, email gateways and portals are common 
examples. The core solution, however, is to employ the 
inherent trust mechanisms contained in the email 
protocol itself. Email should be automatically 
encrypted and digitally signed to ensure message 
integrity and sender authentication to eliminate spear 
phishing attacks. 
Trust mechanisms for email have existed for 
decades, but unfortunately these remain mostly unused 
or misunderstood. Barriers to use include the lack of a 
globally scalable publishing & retrieval mechanism for 
end-user cryptographic certificates and the complexity 
of current email security solutions.  Ease-of-use is a 
common objection from anyone who has set up or 
renewed personal email certificates in laptops and 
mobile devices.  Automated policy enforcement is also 
lacking. 
Extensions to the DNS-based DANE protocol have 
been published [7, 8, 9] to address improvements for 
email security. In a nutshell, these DANE extensions 
use the existing infrastructure of DNS and DNSSEC to 
create a secure global repository of end-user X.509 
certificates and the cryptographic credentials that 
authenticate email servers. 
By itself, however, it would be unlikely for DANE 
to be widely deployed for the same reasons that 
S/MIME is not widely used; the lack of simple-to-use 
end-user solutions.   The current email security 
ecosystem has multiple interdependent components 
that involve PKI certificate authorities, DNS 
provisioning systems, email host servers, and email 
client programs that run in a variety of end-user 
devices such as laptops, tablets and smartphones.  
Consumers today are used to a world where entire 
solutions are available by simply “downloading an 
app”, not by having to integrate pieces from multiple 
sources using a complicated set of installation 
instructions from a variety of vendors. 
The benefits of DANE will not be realized without 
catalyzing its technology within a broader approach for 
ease-of-use.  Due to email’s history, evolution, and the 
wide variety of vendors, it is also unlikely that there 
will be a day-one event in which all components are 
simultaneously interrelated.   
This paper suggests methods to overcome these 
usage barriers via an incremental approach towards 
ease of use. We advocate automation techniques to 
manage the provisioning, maintenance and policy 
directives for credentials.  Each step is useful in its 
own right; combined together they bring us closer to a 
more complete and deployable solution for end 
consumers.  We also describe current pilot 
implementations of DANE email extensions and 
proposed international government mandates. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 gives background regarding basic email 
security mechanisms. Section 3 describes the IETF 
DANE email extensions. Section 4 suggests 
components for automation and ease-of-use that would 
enable wider deployment of DANE. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and Related Work  
 
2.1. S/MIME and OpenPGP: 
       Use and Limitations 
 
The email protocol [10] is over 30 years old and 
was originally restricted to text-only messages. It was 
later enriched with Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions (MIME) for attaching files, formatted text, 
HTML audio, video, applications and graphics [11, 12, 
13]. This extended its usefulness beyond measure. 
Trust mechanisms for confidentiality, authentication 
and data integrity were addressed by extending email 
with Secure/MIME (S/MIME) [14, 15] and with an 
alternative method, OpenPGP for MIME [16].  Both 
S/MIME and OpenPGP use public key cryptography to 
digitally sign and encrypt email messages. 
  Public Key Cryptography is a method in which an 
email user generates a public/private key-pair that is 
either signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) or 
encoded into a self-signed certificate.  The added value 
the CA brings is that it is a third party that is vouching 
for some portion of the identity metadata stored in the 
certificate along with the public key. The public key 
certificate is meant to be globally available to anyone 
so that they may use S/MIME to encrypt email. The 
private key, held only by the email recipient, is used to 
decrypt these messages. The private key is also used to 
generate digital signatures for email. Since only the 
sender has the private key, this mechanism ensures 
authenticity of the email sender and additionally 
ensures that no changes were made to the message 
(data integrity). Fraudulent email will not be able to be 
signed. 
  Unfortunately, use of S/MIME today is spotty at 
best. The trust mechanism is cryptographically sound, 
but operational issues have stalled its use. These 
include: 
• Creation of user key-pairs and installation of 
private keys onto multiple devices. 
• Global Distribution of public key certificates. 
• Lack of a name-space to authenticate public key 
certificates 
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• Resisting spammer techniques such as ”cousin 
domains” 
• Lack of enforced policy and feedback 
mechanisms 
The manual steps involved in generating and 
installing personal cryptographic keys can be difficult 
and time-consuming, therefore most users simply don’t 
do it. Furthermore, users have multiple devices and 
multiple email identities. Transporting private keys 
from a laptop to a smartphone or tablet is a possible but 
confusing process. The end result: no keys, no trusted 
email, increased risk. 
Assuming a user has mastered the art of key 
installation and management, the next step is to 
distribute the public key certificates. Unfortunately, 
there is no global key repository in which one can 
publish and retrieve the public key of an individual. 
Instead, it is usually done by S/MIME users manually 
distributing keys to desired recipients by sending them 
a digitally signed email. OpenPGP distributes keys 
using a web of trust via ”key-exchange parties” and a 
limited set of well-known key exchange servers. 
Neither S/MIME nor OpenPGP scale well and this 
limits use. A vendor cannot send encrypted email to a 
customer for whom the key is unknown. 
Another operational problem is the existence of 
fraudulent certificates. It is possible for rogue CAs to 
generate fake server or email certificates. Recipients 
don’t normally examine email certificates to see if they 
are correct. They assume that if a certificate exists, it 
must be valid. To avoid using malicious credentials, it 
is desirable to link the authorized certificates into a 
global managed name space such as the Domain Name 
System (DNS). This is described further in the next 
section. 
Related to fake certificates is the use of “cousin 
domains”, defined by Steve Crocker as “a registered 
domain name that is deceptively similar to a target 
domain name. The target domain is familiar to many 
end-users, and therefore imparts a degree of trust. The 
deceptive similarity can trick the user by embedding 
the essential parts of the target name, in a new string, 
or it can use some variant of the target name, such as 
replacing ’i’ with ’1’.” As an example, an email from 
someone@examp1e.net (using a “one” character 
instead of the letter “l”) might easily be mistaken for 
the legitimate someone@example.net even if 
digitally signed by the fraudulent domain owner. 
S/MIME by itself has no policy directives or 
feedback mechanisms.  Automated policy enforcement 
could tighten the controls on acceptance or rejection of 
emails and provide feedback on failure mechanisms. A 
simple example would be to create a mailbox for a user 
that only accepts digitally signed email. All others (e.g. 
spear phishing messages) would be rejected. Another 
policy could be to enforce sender signing and 
encryption. 
Sections 3 and 4 will describe methods to overcome 
these obstacles to make trusted email pervasive.  
 
2.2. SPF, DKIM and DMARC 
 
Because of the enormous growth in spam and 
phishing, various methods have been developed to 
limit their propagation. All of these methods use the 
DNS to publish and retrieve IETF standard records that 
dictate policy to an email server. Organizations such as 
the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and the 
Mobile, Messaging and Mail Anti-Abuse Working 
Group (M3AAWG) have encouraged their adoption. 
Although very useful in the context of spam, note that 
these do not constitute a full trust model for email. 
However they do complement S/MIME and DANE 
and would be incorporated in a comprehensive email 
solution. They are described here for completeness. 
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [17, 18] is a 
simple method to detect email spoofing by letting a 
sending domain identify and assert the authorized mail 
senders for a given domain. SPF removes guesswork as 
to the authenticity of a sending email server. This 
benefits receivers by allowing greater accuracy in 
quarantining and blocking. 
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [19] is a 
method to detect email spoofing by checking whether 
incoming mail from a domain has ben actually sent 
from that domain. Authorized sending email servers 
cryptographically sign all email headers (and email 
bodies) with the domain’s private key. This signature 
allows the receiver to verify that email purported to 
come form a specific domain is authorized by the 
owner of the domain.  It also allows verification as to 
whether headers or the message body was tampered 
with after it left the sending email server. The private 
key used to generate signatures is common to all email 
messages from that server.  This means that DKIM 
does not offer true end-to-end digital signing, as the 
sending MTA generates the DKIM signature, not the 
original sender of the message. Verification is carried 
out at the receiving MTA using the domain’s public 
key that is published in the DNS. 
A problem with SPF and DKIM is the lack of 
feedback regarding its effectiveness. How many emails 
were blocked? Were mistakes made in setting policies 
or have all authorized senders been accounted for? Can 
a domain test the effectiveness of DKIM before fully 
turning it on? 
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, 
and Conformance (DMARC) [20] was defined to 
address these issues. DMARC was conceived to allow 
email senders to specify policy on how their mail 
2898
  
should be handled, the types of reports that receivers 
can send back and the frequency of reports. DMARC 
allows domain owners to know the extent to which 
unauthorized senders are using their domain. 
 
2.3. Proprietary Systems 
 
A number of commercial and open source products 
have been created to fill the void in email security. 
These can be appliances or cloud-based SaaS 
(Software as a Service). Systems include firewall 
products from FireEye, Cisco, SonicWall and others. 
SpamHaus, Sophos and Barracuda produce real-time 
query systems to determine if email is coming from a 
non-trusted source. AntiSpam protection and email 
security gateways are available from MXLogic 
(acquired by Intel), TrendMicro, FortiNet and others. 
Proprietary email encryption products have been 
created due to the S/MIME limitations outlined earlier. 
Zix and ProofPoint are example products used by 
companies that need a fully functional email 
encryption solution. These are closed systems, 
however, and all parties have to use the same solution 
environment. Typically used in the financial sector, 
these proprietary solutions can be complex, and are 
neither universally available across diverse groups nor 
interoperable due to their walled-garden nature. 
 
3. DANE  
 
Supply Chain Management is a global process. Its 
diverse community of suppliers, customers and 
integrators typically use differing processes and 
systems. Interoperability of trusted email across this 
community is an absolute requirement. Proprietary 
solutions are inadequate due to their closed nature. A 
standards-based approach to trusted email, on the other 
hand, achieves universality and interoperability. 
This leads to using standard S/MIME; it already 
exists and is available across all mail servers and 
clients. In fact, S/MIME can be and is used today, but 
the challenge in managing key distribution makes 
global scaling difficult. This limitation can be 
overcome, however, by means of the DANE protocol. 
DANE uses the global DNS infrastructure to overcome 
key distribution issues. It also solves problems in 
securing communication between mail exchange 
servers. Its use of the existing DNS infrastructure 
implies that solutions are readily deployable and 
affordable.  
 
 
 
 
3.1. The DANE Mechanism 
 
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities 
(DANE, RFC6698) [7, 8]  is a mechanism used to bind 
X.509 certificates into the DNS. The records are made 
cryptographically secure via the DNSSEC security 
extensions [21, 22, 23]. DANE can be used to store 
self-signed certificates, or to authorize specific X.509 
certificates from a registered CA. It does this by 
publishing the X.509 certificate (or fingerprint thereof) 
in the appropriate specialized DANE resource record 
according to its usage:  TLSA for certificates used to 
support TLS in applications, OPENGPGKEY or 
SMIMEA to support OpenPGP and S/MIME 
respectively. 
One motivation for creating DANE was to solve 
issues with the existing X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). DANE, for example, addresses 
rejection of fraudulent certificates, permits simpler 
handling of certificate revocation, creates a mechanism 
for global publishing and retrieval of certificates, and 
allows the authorization of self-signed certificates. 
DANE achieves these goals by using the delegation 
property of the DNS name space, meaning that only 
authorized domain owners can place records in their 
DNS domain. As an example, only the “example.com” 
corporation can place records in the example.com 
DNS name space. No one else can do so because they 
do not have access to the delegation. Delegation 
enables the creation of an authorization mechanism. 
The first application of the DANE protocol was for 
the authentication of TLS certificates used by web 
servers.  Consider a web site www.example.com. 
Assume that multiple certificates exist for that site, a 
real one and several fraudulent ones used by attackers 
for man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM). How can 
www.example.com protect itself? The solution is 
for the domain owner to insert a DANE TLSA record 
in the www.example.com DNS namespace to 
authorize only the genuine certificate. Web clients that 
retrieve certificates from a server can also retrieve the 
DANE record and match it against the certificate. If the 
DANE record exists and matches, the certificate is 
authorized and the connection is accepted. If the record 
does not match, the certificate is rejected and the 
connection is denied. 
The DANE protocol is meant to be generic and 
multi-purpose. Application-specific use of DANE is 
defined in separate RFCs. Email usage is defined in 
two documents: RFC 7672 [24] defines TLSA records 
to secure the SMTP protocol for email servers, and an 
IETF draft document [9] defines SMIMEA records to 
secure end-user email certificates. We will explore 
each of these in turn. 
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3.2. DANE for MTA-MTA Security 
 
A simplified email architecture is illustrated in 
figure 1. Email clients are programs such as Outlook, 
Apple Mail or Thunderbird that run in user devices 
(smartphones, tablets, laptops) to compose, send and 
retrieve email. Email is sent from these clients to Mail 
Transfer Agents (MTA) that store and forward the 
messages among themselves and finally to the recipient 
email client. 
 
User mail client User mail client 
Mail Server 
(MSA / MTA) 
Mail Server 
(MSA / MTA) 
“STARTTLS” 
DNS w DANE records 
 
 
Figure 1:  Simplified Email Architecture 
 
Mail Transfer Agents will encrypt data sent from 
one MTA to another if TLS is available. This is a 
privacy measure for data-in-motion only. Once 
transferred, the data-at-rest is in plaintext. 
Unfortunately, The original SMTP protocol did not 
accommodate TLS. To fix this, a new command, 
STARTTLS, was added to the protocol. STARTTLS 
modifies an existing insecure connection and upgrades 
it to a secure connection using SSL/TLS. The 
STARTTLS implementation, however, employs 
opportunistic TLS; that is, the receiving server can 
refuse the command and data communications between 
the two servers will continue in plaintext. 
Opportunistic TLS creates vulnerability. An 
attacker can use a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack 
by simplify refusing the STARTTLS request. This 
allows eavesdropping and potential message 
modification by an attacker. 
DANE eliminates this vulnerability as illustrated by 
the block diagram in figure 1. Before issuing a 
STARTTLS, the sending mail server will query the 
DNS for the DANE TLSA record associated with the 
receiving server. If a record exists, STARTTLS 
becomes mandatory. If a server refuses the STARTTLS 
request or if the certificate does not match the DANE 
TLSA record, communication between the servers will 
cease and the email server will wait to send the 
message at a later time. If a TLSA record does not 
exist, opportunistic TLS is still used. The absence or 
presence of a TLSA record permits incremental 
deployment of this DANE security mechanism. 
DANE therefore achieves two goals for MTAs: it 
authenticates the receiver (certificate match), and 
enforces confidentiality via encryption between MTAs. 
Several email servers have already been modified to 
take advantage of this capability, including the popular 
open-source Postfix server. 
 
3.2.1 Current Deployment of MTA-MTA Security 
Using DANE 
 
    The use of DANE for SMTP was specified in 2015 
so deployment has been sparse as developers add the 
functionality to their implementations. There has been 
a sizable deployment within Germany and some 
experiences have been documented [25]. Using TLSA 
RRs to publish certificate information has been called 
out by the German Federal Office of Information 
Security as mandated for deployment as part of the 
“Email Made in Germany” initiative [26].  
 
3.3. DANE for End-User Email Security 
 
As mentioned, DANE for MTAs protects data-in-
motion only.  It does nothing for end-user 
authentication, digital signatures or data-at-rest 
encryption. For this we must use S/MIME. But the 
challenge has always been key management and 
distribution.  
Assume employees in two organizations, 
purple.com and green.com need to communicate 
with each other using confidential and authenticated 
email. The employees have already obtained X.509 
certificates. But how do personnel at either company 
obtain access to the public certificates of employees 
from the other company?  There is no global public 
repository or “certificate phone book”, where one can 
easily look up this information.  As we explain below, 
however, DANE does provide just such a capability by 
publishing records in the global DNS. 
Internet draft [9] extends DANE by defining the 
SMIMEA record. SMIMEA follows the same format as a 
TLSA record, but is used to store X.509 certificate data 
for individual users. The draft also defines a method to 
convert an email address, john.doe@purple.com 
into a domain name. The domain name uses a 
truncated SHA-256 hash of the user name to provide 
rudimentary privacy. The data stored in the SMIMEA 
record could be a complete X.509 certificate or a 
fingerprint. The DNS, secured by DNSSEC, is now a 
trusted repository or an authentication method for end 
user email certificates. 
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The process for end-user security is illustrated in 
figure 2. A user at green.com digitally signs a 
message with her private key. This is done directly in 
the email client on her device. Next, in order to encrypt 
the message, a query to the DNS is made to retrieve the 
recipient’s public key certificate. This certificate is 
cached by the user for future use and used to encrypt 
the message. Using the public key certificate ensures 
that only the recipient can decrypt the message. 
Performing the operation in the recipient’s device 
ensures data-at-rest confidentiality. The signed and 
encrypted message is then transferred to the recipient 
through another encryption layer at the MTA to MTA 
level. 
When the employee at purple.com receives the 
message, it is decrypted on his device via his private 
key. The user now needs to authenticate this message; 
did it really come from the sender at green.com, or 
is it a cleverly crafted spear phishing message? To 
confirm authenticity, the email program must check the 
veracity of the digital signature. This is done by 
performing a DNS lookup of the sender’s public key 
certificate.  The public key is used to decrypt the 
digital signature and perform a data integrity check. If 
the signature validates correctly, the message is 
authentic. It has not been altered in transit and the 
originator has been confirmed. 
 
3.4. Policy:  DMARC applied to DANE 
 
As described in section 2.2, DMARC defines policy 
directives dictating the behavior of DKIM.  It also 
provides a feedback mechanism to report on actual 
behavior. DANE can benefit from a similar 
mechanism. To that end, a draft proposing DMARC 
extensions for DANE [28] is currently a work-in-
progress at the IETF. Sample policy directives include 
• Receiver mail must be signed 
• Receiver mail must be encrypted 
• Sender mail must be signed 
• Sender mail must be encrypted 
Without these policies, users have to be attentive as 
to whether a received email has been digitally signed, 
typically indicated by an icon somewhere in the 
message. These indicators are easy to miss. Unsigned 
spear phishing messages without the icon could arrive 
unnoticed and potentially be acted upon. 
To build strong protection, an organization could 
construct two inboxes for users. The “protected” inbox 
would enforce strict policy dictating all incoming email 
must be signed. The “unsafe” inbox accepts all mail, 
signed or unsigned. Official company business would 
be conducted within the protected mailbox. Other 
business could still be handled in the unsafe mailbox, 
but users now have the burden of checking for 
signatures. 
Feedback mechanisms are currently being defined, 
but typically would report on various metrics such as 
failure counts, etc. 
 
3.5. Objections and Alternatives to DANE 
 
While this paper advocates the usage of DANE, 
there are several criticisms of the method.  The Internet 
blog articles [29, 30] discuss its dependency on 
Email authentication: digitally signed email prevent phishing/forgery 
Security from Mail server to Mail Server and Email User to Email User 
DNSSEC 
 
DANE 
Certificate Authority 
Public key information  
Learned through DANE 
Public key information  
Learned through DANE 
Organization ”Green” Organization ”Purple” 
Mail Server Mail Server 
Protected by “Purple’s” public key Protected by “Green’s” public key 
 
Figure 2:  DANE system showing certificate retrieval for MTA and end-users  (source: NIST [27]) 
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DNSSEC and prompted many pro and con arguments.  
It should be noted that [30] limits its discussion to 
DANE for web site validation, as SMIMEA had not 
yet been introduced.   
A counter-proposal for securing MTA-to-MTA 
communication has been proposed in a working draft 
at the IETF [31] for SMTP Strict Transport Security 
(STS). Like DANE, DKIM and DMARC, this protocol 
also publishes records in the DNS, however STS does 
not require DNSSEC. SMTP-STS is similar to STS for 
web servers, but modified for relevancy to SMTP. It 
works by having the receiving domain publish its 
security policy at a well-defined URL, which a sender 
accesses using HTTPS. Advantages are that it defines 
policies and feedback reporting and does not mandate 
the use of DNSSEC.  Disadvantages are that it can be 
spoofed or DDoSed (Distributed Denial of Service) to 
make it appear that a policy is nonexistent. In addition, 
sending MTAs must now use HTTPS to insure that a 
secure channel exists. In contrast, DANE with 
DNSSEC has secure responses and proof of 
nonexistence built in. 
STS is a trust mechanism for MTA to MTA only. It 
does nothing for client certificates used for end-to-end 
encryption and digital signing.  SMIMEA remains as a 
viable key distribution method. 
Research on the robustness, security, resilience and 
efficiency of DANE are only beginning at this time.  
This is a topic for future development.  Current pilot 
programs are focusing on interoperability and core 
features. 
 
3.6. Deployments & Government Programs 
 
DANE can be deployed today and multiple 
organizations have already done so. The Internet 
Society Deploy360 Programme has created a website 
[32] listing some current deployments. 
Of particular note is the trusted email showcase and 
testbed at NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence (NCCoE) [33]. The purpose of this NCCoE 
project is to demonstrate interoperability among 
commercially available DANE technologies from 
various suppliers. The use and setup of these 
technologies is being prepared to help government and 
private enterprise deploy DANE on their own. 
The testbed has several environments contributed 
by Microsoft, Secure64, NLNetLabs, and ISC-Bind. 
Each environment contains DNSSEC servers, email 
servers, and email clients making use of DANE. Email 
can be exchanged between the environments to 
demonstrate interoperability in MTA-to-MTA security 
as well as end-user security with DANE S/MIME. 
NIST has also published an excellent reference 
document to describe the principles and techniques 
currently available for secure email: Trusted Email 
(Special Publication SP-800-177) [27]. 
Other government involvement includes the drafting of 
proposed mandates that require DANE. The German 
government has published BSI TR-03108 Secure E-
mail Transport [26], dated August 2015, requiring the 
use of DANE. 
 
4. Workflow Automation 
 
DANE removes the biggest limitation to using 
S/MIME on a global scale by creating a secure public 
repository of email certificates.  The other limitations 
listed in section 2.1 still need to be addressed, as well 
as methods to make DANE easier to use.  There are 
complexities in its use that begs for a more complete 
and automated solution. 
As an example, an organization could use DANE as 
it exists today, however deployment would likely be 
limited to a small scale. This is because TLSA and 
SMIMEA records have to be manually generated and 
maintained. Mistakes are easy to make.  Managing a 
trusted email environment will be difficult without 
proper tools and processes.  
The objectives for managing a trusted email 
environment include the ability to automate DNS 
provisioning, integrate company workflows, simplify 
end-user activities, and manage company policy.  To 
that end, the following items are being developed or 
already exist to assist DANE deployment and 
operations: 
• Automated DNS zone file provisioner for TLSA, 
SMIMEA, SPF, DKIM and DMARC records. 
• Automated DNSSEC signing appliances (e.g. 
Secure64, OpenDNSSEC) or DNSSEC enabled 
managed DNS services. 
• Interfaces to Human Resource credential 
databases (e.g. Active Directory, etc.) 
• Means to acquire or generate X.509 certificates 
either with an API to commercial CA accounts, 
an enterprise local CA, or tools to generate self-
signed certificates. 
• GUI objects and wizards to manage trust policies 
expressed as DMARC and DMARC/DANE 
records. Interfaces to legacy DMARC generation 
systems. 
• Mail servers with milters for handling DANE and 
DMARC policy directives. 
• Blacklist managers to block cousin domains. 
• Integration with legacy email gateways and 
DMARC data collectors / report generators (e.g. 
Agari and others). 
• Mobile Device Managers that provision personal 
devices with X.509 certificates and interface to 
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the DNS provisioner to exchange publishable 
trust data. 
• Key escrow as an option for organizations whose 
policy requires that they have copies of end-
user’s private keys. 
• Logging and Auditing with interfaces to SIEM 
systems. 
A critical solution component is a DNS 
Provisioning System. The basic function of DNS 
record provisioning is to manage the workflow for 
creation and maintenance of DNS records and zone 
files. This task must be done with little or no manual 
intervention. Software API’s link the provisioner to 
other components such as employee databases (e.g. 
Active Directory), mobile device managers (MDM), 
and Certificate Authority APIs.  The provisioner could 
run locally or as a service in the cloud.  The workflows 
to be managed are: 
• MTA management: Automate discovery of mail 
servers and provisioning of TLSA, DKIM, 
DMARC and SPF records. Dynamically 
Maintain records due to external events such 
as server changes or certificate expiration or 
revocation. Interface with commercial 
systems for DMARC feedback (e.g. Agari). 
Software wizards and GUI objects would be 
needed to assist in policy definition for DANE 
and DKIM as well as interfaces to commercial 
systems for this function. 
• Employee Credential Management: 
- Initial setup: Scrape the employee database to 
create S/MIMEA records. Company policy 
would dictate if private keys are owned by the 
corporation or by the individual. If the 
corporation owns the keys, certificates can be 
generated by a central system. If the 
individual owns the private keys, then only 
the individual’s end user device should create 
key-pairs and the provisioner device API or 
MDM API will fetch this from user devices. 
- Employee hire or termination: This is best 
handled directly in the HR department 
through an API. Credentials would be 
established or revoked and the provisioning 
system would update its local database and 
DNS zone files on demand. 
- Certificate renewal or revocation: Manage 
the integration with HR databases, Certificate 
Authorities, and MDM to end-user devices; 
update records in the DNS. 
 
Provisioning handles the supply side of certificate 
publication.  The retrieval side is also in need of 
automation and simplification.  Modern email clients 
such as Outlook, Office 365, Apple Mail, and 
Thunderbird have built-in encryption and digital 
signature verification using S/MIME.  What they do 
not currently have is the ability to automatically 
retrieve DANE-formatted public keys from the DNS as 
mail is being composed and sent.  
End-users should be able to use email with little or 
no change to existing email usage. This requires 
transparent integration of DANE into the end-user 
devices and easier methods to install user credentials. 
It is expected that vendors of mobile and PC-based 
email clients will add this capability.   In the temporary 
absence of such systems, simple standalone 
applications can fetch credentials from the DNS to 
store public certificates in the end-user device.  Plugins 
to mailers such as Thunderbird have already been 
developed to make this step automatic.   
 
4.1. Incremental Deployment 
 
These suggestions for automation and usability may 
take some time to be fully realized. The authors wish to 
emphasize, however, that the core elements to build a 
DANE-enabled email system using manual steps is 
immediately available.  Additional functionality can be 
implemented incrementally over time as new tools 
become available.  A possible sequence of events is as 
follows: 
 
1) Manual provisioning of DANE records:  Early 
adopters are demonstrating the benefits of 
DANE, but manual implementation is 
impractical for the wider audience.  
Nevertheless, scripts are currently available for 
constructing TLSA and SMIMEA records and 
these can be installed in an organization’s 
authoritative DNS servers immediately. 
 
2) Manual retrieval of certificates: some 
standalone apps and email client plugins are 
available and more are under development.    
These programs access email contact lists from 
user devices to fetch email credentials and 
insert them into the device’s keystore.   These 
tools require manual intervention by the user 
rather than the more desirable goal of 
transparent fetching of credentials within an 
email client. 
 
3) Mail Filters (Milters) to automatically fetch 
encryption certificates at the mail server.  
SMILLA [34] is an existing example milter 
that encrypts mail at the server instead of at the 
sending email client.  This provides a “90% 
solution”; that is, it provides data-at-rest 
protection at the end user device with messages 
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uniquely encrypted for the recipient, but does 
not perform encryption at the first mile 
between the sending device and the mail 
server.  The solution is still useful, however, 
since this first mile communication is typically 
encrypted with TLS. 
 
4) Future automated provisioning of SMIMEA 
records: organizations will be able to publish 
their employee certificates more easily, but the 
recipients of email will still have no client 
applications (e.g. Thunderbird, Exchange, 
Apple Mail) to automatically retrieve these 
certificates.  
 
5) Future fully transparent email client 
integration:  No manual intervention required 
by the end-user to retrieve public keys. 
 
6) Future security policy Enforcement on servers 
and end-user devices:  creates the possibility of 
inboxes that only accept signed and/or 
encrypted email.   
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The authors have demonstrated the need for trusted 
email in supply chain management. Spear phishing, 
forgery, and other attacks can result in data breaches, 
industrial and government espionage, installation of 
malware, and financial theft. DANE email extensions 
are then posited as a solid foundation for global trusted 
email. DANE creates a secure repository for publishing 
and retrieving email credentials and policy directives 
on a globally scalable basis.     
Research on the efficiency, security and robustness 
of DANE email, as well as in-depth comparisons to 
other technologies is only in the starting phases.  
Current pilots are focusing on interoperability and core 
functionality.   This is a topic for future development.  
Despite its promising capabilities, however, the 
basic DANE protocol is nothing more than an enabling 
technology at this time.  A complete trusted email 
solution will require the development of an ecosystem 
of automated tools, procedures and the incorporation of 
new DANE features into existing popular email client 
programs.   
To this end, supplementary automation tools to 
manage the workflow of DANE are proposed.  The 
tools discussed are for both sides of the equation:  the 
automated publishing of email certificates as well as 
email client features and plugins to simplify the 
retrieval of certificates and make user interaction with 
trusted email as transparent as possible. Some 
components are under development; some already 
exist.  
Finally, the authors encourage supply chain 
managers to reduce risk by protecting their email with 
basic DANE technology as soon as possible. 
Implementing DANE trusted email manually with the 
existing infrastructure components is definitely 
possible using published scripts and tools.  The basic 
functionality can then be expanded into a more robust, 
automated, and easier to use solution for a more 
general audience as additional tools become available. 
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